



Veblen’s Theory of the Leisure Class Revisited: 









Almost all previous studies on public policy under relative consumption concerns 
have ignored the role of leisure for status comparisons. Inspired by Veblen (1899), 
this paper considers a two-type optimal income tax model, where people care about 
their relative consumption, and where the importance of relative consumption 
increases with the use of leisure due to increased consumption visibility. We show 
that increased consumption positionality typically implies higher marginal income tax 
rates for both ability-types. Using a leisure-weighted measure of reference 
consumption, rather than a measure where leisure plays no role as in the previous 
literature, increases the marginal income tax rate implemented for the low-ability type 
and decreases the marginal income tax rate implemented for the high-ability type, i.e., 
it gives rise to a regressive tax component. 
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 Closely related to the requirement that the gentleman must consume freely and of the right kind 
of goods, there is the requirement that he must know how to consume them in a seemly manner. 
His life of leisure must be conducted in due form…  




The Theory of the Leisure Class by Veblen (1899) remains the classic reference to the 
idea of “conspicuous consumption,” according to which individuals may signal wealth 
– or status more generally – via their consumption behavior. Today, a substantial body 
of empirical evidence suggests that people care about their relative consumption, i.e., 
their consumption relative to that of others – a possible indication of status seeking – 
and hence not just their absolute consumption as in conventional economic theory.
1 
Yet, and somewhat paradoxically given the title and content of Veblen’s book, almost 
the entire (rapidly growing) policy-oriented literature dealing with optimal tax and 
expenditure responses to relative consumption comparisons has ignored the role of 
leisure in such comparisons.
2 The only exception that we are aware of is a paper on 
optimal income taxation by Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2009), in which both 
private consumption and leisure are treated as positional goods, i.e., individuals derive 
                                                 
1 This empirical evidence includes happiness research (e.g., Easterlin 2001; Blanchflower and Oswald 
2004; Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2005; Luttmer 2005), questionnaire-based experiments
1 (e.g., Johansson-
Stenman et al. 2002; Solnick and Hemenway 2005; Carlsson et al. 2007), and, more recently, brain 
science (Fliessbach et al. 2007). There are also recent evolutionary models consistent with relative 
consumption concerns (Samuelson 2004; Rayo and Becker 2007). Stevenson and Wolfers (2008) 
constitute a recent exception in the happiness literature, claiming that the role of relative income is 
overstated. 
2 Earlier studies dealing with public policies in economies where agents have positional preferences 
address a variety of issues such as optimal taxation, public good provision, social insurance, growth, 
environmental externalities, and stabilization policy; see, e.g., Boskin and Sheshinski (1978), Layard 
(1980), Oswald (1983), Frank (1985, 2005, 2008), Ng (1987), Blomquist (1993), Corneo and Jeanne 
(1997, 2001), Brekke and Howarth (2002), Abel (2005), Blumkin and Sadka (2007), Aronsson and 
Johansson-Stenman (2008, in press), Wendner and Goulder (2008), Kanbur and Tuomala (2010), and 
Wendner (2010a, b). An alternative approach is to assume conventional preferences where, instead, 
relative consumption has instrumental value; see, e.g., Cole et al. (1992, 1998). Clark et al. (2008) 
provide a good overview of both the empirical evidence and economic implications of relative 
consumption concerns. 
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utility from their own consumption and use of leisure, respectively, relative to the 
consumption and use of leisure among others. They find that relative consumption 
concerns typically contribute to increase the optimal marginal income tax rates for all 
individuals, whereas concern for relative leisure has an offsetting role. Furthermore, 
this offsetting role is not symmetric: concern about relative leisure implies a 
progressive income tax component, i.e., a component that is larger for high-ability 
than for low-ability individuals. 
 
The present paper concerns optimal nonlinear income taxation in an economy where 
consumers derive utility from their own consumption relative to that of others. In line 
with the ideas of Veblen (1899), we assume that leisure has a displaying role in 
making relative consumption more visible, rather than being a positional good in 
itself. Thus, in our model, we do not assume that individuals care about their own use 
of leisure relative to that of other people; instead, their own and others’ use of leisure 
will matter in the sense of making their own and others’ private consumption more 
visible. Intuitively, people will have a hard time noticing a person’s new BMW if 
he/she works all the time. We believe that this approach is closer to the spirit of 
Veblen. 
 
There are (at least) two aspects of such consumption visibility. First, the utility gain 
(loss) to an individual with higher (lower) relative consumption may increase with 
his/her use of leisure. Second, the positional consumption externality that each 
individual imposes on others may increase with the time he/she spends on leisure. We 
discuss both these aspects below, and show that only the latter directly affects the 
policy rules for marginal income taxation.  
 
Section 2 presents the basic model, which is based on the assumption that each 
individual compares his/her own consumption with a leisure-influenced average of 
other people’s consumption, and analyzes the outcome of private optimization. The 
optimal tax problem is characterized in Section 3, where we utilize the two-type 
model with optimal nonlinear income taxation with asymmetric information between 
the government and the private sector developed by Stern (1982) and Stiglitz (1982) 
as our basic workhorse. This model provides a simple – yet very powerful – 
framework for capturing redistributive and corrective aspects of income taxation as   4
well as for capturing the policy incentives caused by interaction between the incentive 
constraint and the desire to internalize positional externalities. The reason why such 
interaction is important is that policies designed to internalize positional externalities 
may either contribute to relax or tighten the incentive constraint. In other words, pure 
externality correction may affect the scope for redistribution.  
 
The optimal taxation results are presented in Section 4, showing for example i) that 
increased concern for relative consumption typically implies higher marginal income 
tax rates for both ability types, and ii) that the displaying role of leisure gives rise to 
regressive income taxation in the sense of increasing the marginal income tax rate 
faced by the low-ability type while decreasing the marginal income tax rate faced by 
the high-ability type. The intuition behind the latter finding is that an increase in the 
use of leisure by the low-ability type contributes to reduce the positional consumption 
externality, whereas an increase in the use of leisure by the high-ability type leads to 
an increase in this externality. 
 
Section 5 extends the analysis by introducing a more general measure of reference 
consumption, which allows for comparisons upwards and downwards in the income 
distribution. This extension is shown to have important policy implications. For 
example, if individuals compare their own consumption solely with that of the high-
ability type, then the consumption of the low-ability type does not give rise to 
positional externalities, and there will consequently be no efficiency-based reason for 
taxing the income of the low-ability type. Relative consumption concerns would then 
induce a progressive tax element. Section 6 provides some concluding remarks, while 
proofs are presented in the Appendix. 
 
 
2. The Consumers’ Preferences and Labor Supply Problem 
 
There are two types of individuals, where the low-ability type (type 1) is less 
productive than the high ability type (type 2), and 
i n  denotes the number of 
individuals of ability type i. An individual of ability type i cares about his/her private   5
consumption, 
i x , and leisure, 
i z , which is given by a time endowment, H , less the 
number of hours of work, 
i l .  
 
In accordance with the bulk of earlier comparable literature on relative consumption 
comparisons, we assume that each individual compares his/her own private 
consumption with a measure of reference consumption, and that the relative 
consumption can be described by the difference between the individual’s own 
consumption and the appropriate reference measure.
3 However, contrary to the same 
earlier literature – and in accordance with Veblen (1899) – we also assume that leisure 
has a displaying role in making relative consumption more visible. To be more 
specific, we assume (i) that the utility gain to the individual with higher relative 
consumption increases with his/her own use of leisure, and (ii) that the positional 
consumption externality that each individual imposes on other people tends to 
increase with the time he/she spends on leisure. The first aspect is captured simply by 
defining the “gain of relative consumption” by the function  ( , )
ii i hzΔ , where 
i z  is the 
time spent on leisure and 
i Δ  is the relevant measure of relative consumption. We 
assume that  0
i
z h >  and  0
i hΔ > , where subindices denote partial derivatives. 
 
The second aspect is captured by measuring the relative consumption as 
ii x Δ= − Ω , 
where Ω is a leisure-influenced measure of others’ consumption,  in the sense that the 
consumption carries a higher weight if accompanied with more use of leisure by the 












where '( ) 0
j fz>  for j = 1,2. This means that increased use of leisure by a particular 
individual increases the weight that this individual’s consumption carries in the 
                                                 
3 See, e.g., Akerlof (1997), Corneo and Jeanne (1997), Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000), Bowles and Park 
(2005), Carlsson et al. (2007), and Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2008, in press). Alternative 
approaches include ratio comparisons (Boskin and Sheshinski 1978; Layard 1980; Wendner and 
Goulder 2008) and comparisons of ordinal rank (Frank 1985; Hopkins and Kornienko 2004, 2009). 
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reference consumption level. We also assume that the curvature of f is non-extreme in 
the sense that  ()
2
()' ' () ' ()
jj j fz f z f z < , implying  ( ) '( ) / ( ) 0
jj j fz f z z ∂ ∂< .
4  
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i x ∂Ω ∂ >  for i=1,2. By adding the assumption that the private 
consumption of the high-ability type always exceeds the private consumption of the 
low-ability type – which is reasonable and also in line with the assumptions 
underlying redistributive policy (to be presented below)  – we have 
1 x <Ω and 
2 x >Ω and, as a consequence, 
1 /0 z ∂Ω ∂ <  and 
2 /0 z ∂Ω∂ >. 
 
The utility function of ability type i can then be written as 
 
 (,,(,) ) (,,) (,,)
i iiiii i iii i iii U Vxzhz vxz uxz =Δ = Δ = Ω .      (1) 
 
The functions  ()
i V ⋅  and  ()
i v ⋅  are increasing in each argument, implying that  ( )
i u ⋅  is 
decreasing in Ω (a property that Dupor and Liu 2003 denote “jealousy”) and 
increasing in the other arguments;  ( )
i V ⋅ , ()
i v ⋅  and  ( )
i u ⋅  are assumed to be twice 
continuously differentiable in their respective arguments and strictly concave. We 
assume that the individual treats Ω as exogenous. The second equality follows 
because the direct effect of 
i z  on  ( )
i h ⋅  – following from the assumption that the 
utility of relative consumption to the individual increases with his/her own use of 
                                                 
4 An obvious example of such a function is  ()
j j f zz = , i.e., a simple proportional relationship. Yet, 
this special case has some unattractive features, e.g., that the consumption weight is zero when leisure 
is equal to zero. In reality, it makes more sense to assume that  (0) 0 f > , such that an individual’s   7
leisure – will be fully internalized by the individual via the labor supply choice. 
Therefore, without loss of generality, we may replace  ()
i V ⋅  with the “reduced form” 
()
i v ⋅ , in which the direct effect of  
i z  on  ( )
i h ⋅  is embedded in the marginal utility of 
leisure.
5 The function  ( )
i u ⋅  represents the most general utility formulation and 
resembles a classic externality problem; here, we do not specify anything about the 
structure of the social comparisons beyond that others’ consumption gives rise to 
externalities. In fact, much of the analysis to be carried out below will be based on the 
function ( )
i u ⋅ . Yet, we need the more restrictive utility formulation based on the 
function  ()
i v ⋅ , where we specify that people care about additive comparisons, to 
establish a relationship between the optimal tax policy on the one hand and the degree 
to which the utility gain of higher consumption is associated with increased relative 
consumption on the other. The latter will be referred to as the “degree of 
positionality,” to which we turn next. 
 
By extending the definition in Johansson-Stenman et al. (2002) to allow for leisure-
weighted consumption comparisons, we define the degree of positionality for ability 
type i, 














,            (2) 
 
where 01
i α <<  follows from our earlier assumptions. The subindices attached to the 
function ()
i v ⋅  denote partial derivatives, so  /
ii i
x vv x ≡ ∂∂  and  /
ii i vv Δ ≡∂ ∂ Δ. The 
parameter 
i α  can then be interpreted as the fraction of the overall utility increase for 
ability type i from the last dollar spent that is due to the increased relative 
consumption. The average degree of positionality then becomes 
 
                                                                                                                                            
consumption affects the reference consumption also when the person works all the time, i.e., has zero 
leisure. The more general expression  ()
j f z allows for this. 
5 This means that 
ii i i










,           (3) 
 
where  01 α << . Empirical estimates of α  (yet based on models where leisure does 
not have a displaying role for consumption comparisons) vary considerably across 
studies, although many of them suggest that the average degree of positionality might 
be substantial (e.g., in the interval 0.2-0.8).
6 We will return to the implications of 
these estimates below. 
 
Let ( )
ii Tw l  denote the income tax payment of ability type i. The individual budget 
constraint is given by  ( )
ii ii i wl T wl x −= , implying the following first order condition 
for the number of hours of work: 
 
 1' ()
ii i i i




x uu x =∂ ∂ , /
ii i
z uu z =∂ ∂ , and  '( )
ii Tw l is the marginal income tax rate. 
 
Turning to the production side of the economy, we follow much of the earlier 
literature on optimal income taxation in assuming that output is produced by a linear 
technology, which is interpreted to mean that the gross wage rates are fixed. This 
assumption simplifies the calculations, but is not of major importance for the 
qualitative results to be derived below. 
 
 
3. The Optimal Tax Problem 
 
The objective of the government is assumed to be a Pareto efficient resource 
allocation, which it accomplishes by maximizing the utility of the low-ability type, 
while holding the utility constant for the high-ability type, subject to a self-selection 
                                                 
6 See, e.g., Alpizar et al. (2005), Solnick and Hemenway (2005), Carlsson et al. (2007), and Wendner 
and Goulder (2008).   9
constraint and the budget constraint.
7 The informational assumptions are 
conventional. The government is able to observe income; yet ability is private 
information. We follow the standard approach in assuming that the government wants 
to redistribute from the high-ability to the low-ability type. This means that the most 
interesting aspect of self-selection is to prevent the high-ability type from pretending 
to be a low-ability type. The self-selection constraint that may bind then becomes 
 
22 2 2 2 1 1 2 ˆ (,,) (, ,) Uu x z u x Hl U φ =Ω ≥ − Ω = ,       (5) 
 
where 
12 / ww φ =  is the wage ratio, i.e., relative wage rate. The expression on the 
right-hand side of the weak inequality is the utility of the mimicker. Although the 
mimicker enjoys the same consumption as the low-ability type, he/she spends more 
time on leisure as the mimicker is more productive than the low-ability type. 
 
As we are considering a pure redistribution problem under positional externalities, 
and by using  ( )
ii ii i Tw l w l x =−  from the private budget constraints, it follows that the 
government’s budget constraint can be written as 
  
ii i i i
ii nwl nx = ∑∑ .           (6) 
 
Therefore, and by analogy with earlier literature based on the self-selection approach 
to optimal income taxation, the marginal income tax rates can be derived by choosing 
the number of hours of work and private consumption for each ability type to 
maximize the Lagrangean 
12 2 2 2
0 ˆ £{ }
ii i i
i
UU U U U n w l x μλγ
⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ =+ − + − + − ⎢ ⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ∑ , 
where 
2
0 U  is an arbitrarily fixed utility level for the high-ability type, while μ ,  λ , 
and  γ  are Lagrange multipliers associated with the minimum utility restriction, the 
                                                 
7 This approach is standard. An alternative approach would be to assume that the government is 
maximizing a social welfare function (again subject to the relevant self-selection and budget 
constraint). This approach would give the same qualitative results in terms of policy rules for the 
marginal income tax rates as those derived below.   10
self-selection constraint and the budget constraint, respectively. This will be described 
in more detail below. The first order conditions for
1 z , 
1 x , 
2 z , and 











,       (7) 
12 1
1




























,       (10) 
 
in which we have used 
22 1 1 ˆ (, ,) uu x Hl φ =− Ω . As before, a subindex attached to the 
utility function represents a partial derivative. 
 
 
4. Optimal Income Taxation 
 
Let  , /
ii i
zx z x MRS u u =  and 
22 2
, ˆ ˆˆ / zx z x MRS u u =  denote the marginal rate of substitution 
between leisure and private consumption for ability type i and the mimicker, 
respectively. By combining equations (7) and (8) and equations (9) and (10), 
respectively, with the private first order condition for number of work hours given by 
equation (4), we show in the Appendix that the optimal marginal income tax rates can 










∂ ∂Ω ∂Ω ⎛⎞ =+ − ⎜⎟ ∂Ω∂ ∂ ⎝⎠
.     (11) 
 
Here, 
i τ  represents the marginal income tax rate implemented for ability type i in the 





zx zx MRS MRS
nw
λ
τ φ =−  and 
2 0 τ = ,   11
where 
*2 ˆ /0 x u λλγ => . The formulas for 
1 τ  and 
2 τ  coincide with the marginal 
income tax rates derived by Stiglitz (1982) for an economy with fixed before-tax 
wage rates. The intuition behind them is that the government may relax the self-
selection constraint by imposing a marginal income tax on the low-ability type, 
whereas no such option exists with respect to the marginal income tax rate of the 
high-ability type. 
 
Turning to the second term on the right hand side of equation (11), two things are 
worth noticing. First, relative consumption concerns lead to a simple additive 
modification of the tax formula. Second, the only reason why the presence of 
positional preferences directly affects the tax formula is that 
i z  and 
i x  directly affect 
Ω (our measure of reference consumption), i.e., that the consumption and leisure 
choices made by each individual directly affect the utility of relative consumption 
perceived by others. Therefore, this extra component is due solely to that each 
individual imposes externalities on others. The other assumption about consumption-
visibility, namely that the private utility gain related to relative consumption increases 
with the individual’s own use of leisure, does not affect the policy rules for marginal 
income taxation, as this effect is already internalized at the individual level and does 
not justify policy intervention. However, this mechanism might of course affect the 
levels of the marginal income tax rates. 
 
Note that when deriving equation (11), we have only assumed that individual utility 
depends (negatively) on Ω according to the function  ( )
i u ⋅  in equation (1). To go 
further, we make use of the function  ()
i v ⋅ , which specifies how each individual’s 
utility depends on relative consumption comparisons. By using equations (7)-(10), we 
show in the Appendix that the welfare effect of an increase in reference consumption, 













=++ − = − +
∂Ω − − %%
,    (12) 
 
where 















measures a leisure-influenced average of the degree of positionality through the 
function ( )
i f z . This term arises here due to the fact that the effect of 
i x  on Ω 
depends on the relative “leisure-share,”  () / ()
ii j j
j nf z nf z ∑ , of ability type i. 
 
Consider the expression after the second equality in equation (12), showing that the 
welfare effect of increased reference consumption can be decomposed into two terms. 
The first reflects the average degree of positionality and contributes negatively to 
welfare, as it represents a negative consumption externality (recall that the individual 
utilities depend negatively on Ω), while the second reflects the difference in the 
degree of positionality between the mimicker and the low-ability type. The latter 
effect is positive if the mimicker is more positional than the low-ability type, in which 
case an increase in Ω contributes to relax the self-selection constraint. On the other 
hand, if the low-ability type is more positional than the mimicker, then this 
component is negative, as an increase in Ω then contributes to tighten the self-
selection constraint. 
  
For pedagogical reasons, we begin by analyzing how the appearance of positional 
preferences contributes to the marginal income tax rates when the self-selection 
constraint does not bind, in which case the government may implement a first best 
policy, and we then continue with the second best model.  
 
First Best Taxation 
  
In the first best, where the self-selection constraint does not bind, we have  0 λ = .  Let 















reflecting how the measure of reference consumption changes in response to increased 
consumption by ability type i, relative to the population share of ability type i. As 
such, 
i π  also reflects the relative leisure weight attached to 
i x  in the measure of   13
reference consumption. Clearly, when 
12 zz =  it follows that 
12 1 ππ = = , and when 
ij zz > , it follows that  1
j i π π << . By using equations (11) and (12), along with the 













,       (13) 
 
we can then derive the following result: 
 
Proposition 1. In the first best, where  0 λ = ,  the marginal income tax rate for ability 















=− − Ω ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
.     (14) 
 
Proof: see the Appendix. 
 
To interpret Proposition 1, it is instructive to begin by considering the simplified (and 
somewhat unrealistic) case where both ability types use the same amount of leisure, 
so 
12 zzz ==  and α α = % , and therefore  1















=− − Ω ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
.       (15) 
    
The first term on the right hand side of equation (15) is the average degree of 
positionality,  α , and contributes to increase the marginal income tax rate for both 
ability types. The intuition is that private consumption causes a negative externality, 
due to others’ reduced relative consumption, equal to α  per unit of consumption. 
Note also that if the consumption externality that each individual imposes on others 
were independent of the individual’s use of leisure, in which case  /
ii
inx N Ω=∑ , 
then '( ) 0
i fz=  for i=1,2 and the second term on the right hand side of equation (15)   14
would vanish. In this case, therefore,  '( )
ii Tw l α =  for i=1, 2 (see Aronsson and 
Johansson-Stenman 2008). 
 
The second term on the right hand of equation (15) is novel and arises because the use 
of leisure affects the externality that each individual imposes on others. Since 
1 x <Ω 
and 
2 x >Ω, this effect means that the tax system becomes regressive in the sense that 
22 11 '( ) '( ) Tw l Tw l α << . The interpretation is straightforward: an increase in the use 
of leisure by the low ability type contributes to reduce the consumption externality, 
whereas an increase in the use of leisure by the high-ability type causes an increase in 
the consumption externality, ceteris paribus, i.e., 
1 /0 z ∂Ω∂ <  and 
2 /0 z ∂Ω ∂ > . 
Therefore, and in addition to the conventional Pigouvian tax component associated 
with relative consumption comparisons, i.e., the first term on the right hand side, there 
is an incentive for the government to decrease the labor supply of the low-ability type 
and increase the labor supply of the high-ability type, which explains the regressive 
tax structure implicit in equation (15). 
 
Now, returning to the more general equation (14), where the use of leisure differs 
between the ability types, the effects described above are still present – in the square 
bracket – although the tax structure is no longer necessarily regressive in the sense 
that the low-ability type faces a higher marginal income tax rate than the high-ability 
type. The reason is that the factor of proportionality, 1/
i ρ , is ability-type specific. 
This component represents an adjustment of the tax structure due to that the 
relationship between 
i x  and Ω depends on the relative use of leisure by ability type i, 
i.e., / ( )/ ( )
iii jj
j x nf z nf z ∂Ω ∂ = ∑ . In other words, the greater this leisure-
influenced weight attached to ability type i, ceteris paribus, the more an increase in 
i x  
will contribute to the positional consumption externality. One can show that  1
i ρ >  
( 1 < ) if 
ki zz >  (
ki zz < ) for i=1,2 andki ≠ . Therefore, this mechanism works to 
increase the marginal income tax rate for the ability type who spends relatively more 
time on leisure and to decrease the marginal income tax rate for the ability type who 
spends relatively less time on leisure at the optimum. 
 
The following result is a direct consequence of Proposition 1:   15
 
Corollary 1. If 
12 zz ≥ , the optimal income tax structure is regressive in the sense 
that 
22 11 '( ) '( ) Tw l Tw l < . 
 
The intuition behind the corollary is that if 
12 zz ≥ , then the proportionality factors 
1 1/ 1 ρ ≥  and 
2 1/ 1 ρ ≤  reinforce the regressive tax component in equation (15). If on 
the other hand 
12 zz < , the proportionality factors work in the opposite direction, 
which means that the marginal income tax rate implemented for the low-ability type 
may either exceed, be equal to, or fall short of the marginal income tax rate 
implemented for the high-ability type. Therefore, a sufficient condition for a 




Returning to the Second Best Model 
 
We will now return to the second best model to analyze how a binding self-selection 
constraint ( 0 λ > ) modifies the first best policy discussed above. To shorten the 
notations, let 









be an indicator of the difference in the degree of consumption positionality between 
the mimicker and the low-ability type. Note that  0 d α >  if the mimicker is more 
positional than the low-ability type; conversely,  0 d α <  if the low-ability type is more 










ζ ⎡⎤ =− Ω ⎣⎦  
we can derive the result: 
 
                                                 
8 This condition corresponds well with empirical evidence for both men and women in Europe and for 
women in the U.S. See Blundell and MaCurdy (1999).   16












⎡ ⎤ − −−
=+ − ⎢ ⎥ − ⎣ ⎦
.           (16) 
 
Proof: see the Appendix. 
 
Once again, it is useful to start with the simplified case where both ability types use 
the same amount of leisure, so 
12 zzz = = ,  α α = %  and  1
i ρ =  for i=1,2, in which 




'( ) (1 )
1







=+−− − ⎢ ⎥ − ⎣ ⎦
.     (17) 
 
Equation (17) reflects a combination of three incentives for marginal income taxation: 
(i) an incentive to relax the self-selection constraint by exploiting that the mimicker 
and the low-ability type differ with respect to use of leisure, as reflected in the 
variable 
i τ ; (ii) an incentive to internalize the positional externality; and (iii) an 
incentive to relax the self-selection constraint by exploiting that the mimicker and the 
low-ability type may differ with respect to degree of positionality, i.e., via  d α . In 
equation (15) above, only incentive (ii) was present. 
 
The first term on the right hand side of equation (17), 
i τ , represents the marginal 
income tax rate that the government would implement in the standard two-type model 
without positional preferences. This component is likely to be positive for the low-
ability type (at least if the form of the utility function does not differ among 
individuals) and zero for the high-ability type. The incentive to internalize the 
positional externality, i.e., the pure correction element, is here captured by the 
expression(1 )
ii τζ α −− , which differs from equation (15) in that this component is 
here reduced by 
i τ  times the average degree of positionality. The intuition is that the 
fraction of an income increase that is already taxed away for other reasons does not 
give rise to positional externalities. Note also that if  d α  is equal to zero (i.e., if the   17
mimicker and the low-ability type do not differ with respect to degree of 
positionality), then the redistributive (i.e., 
i τ ) and corrective components reinforce 
each other in the sense that their joint effect is a regressive income tax structure. In 
this case, therefore, and by analogy to equation (15), we have 
22 11 '( ) '( ) Tw l Tw l α << . 
 
Finally, the sign of the third component in equation (17), i.e., the expression 
proportional to  d α , depends on the difference in degree of positionality between the 
mimicker and the low-ability type. Suppose first that  0 d α > , meaning that the 
mimicker is more positional than the low-ability type. This suggests that increased 
reference consumption, i.e., an increase in Ω, causes a larger utility loss for the 
mimicker than for the low-ability type.
9 As a consequence, the government may relax 
the self-selection constraint by implementing policies that lead to increased reference 
consumption. This means that the third term on the right hand side of equation (17) 
contributes to decreased marginal income taxation for both ability types. On the other 
hand, if  0 d α < , then the opposite argument applies as the government may, in this 
case, relax the self-selection constraint by implementing a policy that leads to lower 
reference consumption. 
 
Note also that the tax-regression result derived earlier will continue to hold under 
certain conditions also in the context of equation (17). For instance, if the self-
selection effect caused by positional concerns, as represented by  d α , does not 
dominate the effect of the average degree of positionality, so that  d α α > , and if 
1 0 τ >  (as in the original Stiglitz 1982 model), then 
11 22 '( ) '( ) Tw l Tw l > . The 
condition  d α α >  always applies if the low-ability type is at least as positional as the 
mimicker, in which case  0 d α ≤ . The intuition is, of course, that the desire to 
internalize positional externalities and the incentive to relax the self-selection 
constraint via policy-induced changes in the reference consumption, i.e., incentives 
(ii) and (iii) referred to above, affect the optimal marginal income tax rates in the 
same direction. However, even if the mimicker is more positional than the low-ability 
type, meaning that  0 d α > , the income tax structure will still be regressive in the 
                                                 
9 Strictly speaking, this interpretation also presupposes that 10
d α − > , which we assume here.   18
sense mentioned above if the condition  d α α >  still applies. On the other hand, if 
d α α < , and if we continue to assume that 
1 0 τ > , then the marginal income tax rate 
implemented for the low-ability type need no longer exceed the marginal income tax 
rate implemented for the high-ability type; in fact, we cannot in this case determine 
whether the low-ability type faces a higher or lower marginal income tax rate than the 
high-ability type. 
 
Returning to the general second best formula in equation (16), it remains to analyze 
the effect of the variable 
i ρ , which was equal to one in the simplified case where both 
ability types use the same amount of leisure. This component works in the same 
general way here as it did in the first best scenario discussed above, with one 
important exception: that it matters for the qualitative effect of an increase or decrease 
in 
i ρ  whether α  exceeds or falls short of  d α . To see this more clearly, let us rewrite 
equation (16) as 
 
  '( ) (1 )
i







⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ − −
=+ − ⎢⎥ ⎢⎥ −− ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦
.     (18) 
 
To interpret equation (18), suppose that 
1 0 τ >  (as in the original Stiglitz 1982 model 
where the utility function does not differ between the ability types), meaning that the 
low-ability type would face a positive marginal income tax rate in the absence of any 
positional concerns. For the high-ability type, the marginal income tax rate reduces to 
the second term on the right hand side of equation (18) because 
2 0 τ =  by the 
assumptions made earlier. Now, since 
1 0 ζ <  and 
2 0 ζ > , and by adding the 
assumption that  d α α > , we again find that the condition 
12 ρ ρ ≤  implies that the 
marginal income tax rate implemented for the low-ability type exceeds that 
implemented for the high-ability type. Therefore, the following result is an immediate 
consequence of Proposition 2: 
 
Corollary 2.  If 
1 0 τ > ,  d α α > , and 
12 zz ≥ , then the income tax structure is 
regressive in the sense that 
11 22 '( ) '( ) Tw l Tw l > .   19
 
The intuition behind Corollary 2 is straightforward: if 
1 0 τ >  and  d α α > , we may 
relax the self-selection constraint and internalize the positional externality by 
implementing a higher marginal income tax rate for the low-ability type than for the 
high-ability type. An important mechanism behind this result – captured by the 
variables 
1 0 ζ <  and 
2 0 ζ >  – is that increased use of leisure by the low-ability type 
contributes to reduce the positional externality, whereas increased use of leisure by 
the high-ability type leads to an increase in the positional externality, ceteris paribus. 
 
 
5. Extension: A More General Measure of Reference Consumption 
 
The analysis carried out so far assumes that the appropriate measure of reference 
consumption at the individual level is given by a leisure-influenced consumption-
average for the economy as a whole, Ω, defined in Section 2. This approach is 
analogous to earlier literature on public policy and relative consumption, where the 
average consumption typically constitutes the reference point. However, it is plausible 
that individuals compare themselves more with some people than with others. For 
instance, Veblen (1899), Duesenberry (1949), and Schor (1998) have argued for the 
importance of an asymmetry, such that “low-income groups are affected by 
consumption of high-income groups but not vice versa” (Duesenberry, 1949, p. 101). 
This is also consistent with the empirical findings of Bowles and Park (2005) that 
more inequality in society tends to imply more work hours. In the context of optimal 
taxation and relative consumption, Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (in press) 
address such “upward comparisons” as an alternative to the conventional mean-value 
comparison; yet without considering the displaying role of leisure discussed here.
10 
 
In this section, we allow for the asymmetry mentioned above while still retaining the 
displaying role of leisure. Consider the following generalized measure of reference 
consumption (which replaces the measure Ω used in earlier sections): 
 
                                                 

















i β ∈  for i=1,2, and  1
j
jβ = ∑ . The parameter 
i β  represents the weight 
given to ability type i's contribution to reference consumption. In other words, we 
allow the ability types to differ with respect to their influences on the reference point. 
Note that 
2 1 β =  implies that 
2 x Ω=
(
, meaning that each individual only compares 
himself/herself with the high-ability type. Similarly, 
1 1 β =  gives 
1 x Ω=
(
, in which 
case each individual only compares himself/herself with the low-ability type. If 
2 (0.5,1] β ∈ , this is interpretable to mean that the leisure-influenced consumption by 
the high-ability type has a more than proportional influence on the measure of 
reference consumption. If, instead, 
1 (0.5,1] β ∈ , we have an analogous interpretation 
for the low-ability type. The analysis carried out in previous sections may, in turn, be 
interpreted as the special case where 
12 0.5 ββ ==. 
 
With the variable Ω
(
 at our disposal, it is straightforward to generalize the expressions 




































ζ ⎡⎤ =− Ω ⎣⎦
( (
, 
which replace the variables α % , 
i ρ , and 
i ζ , respectively, in the previous section, and 
consider the following result: 
 
Proposition 3.  With the generalized measure of reference consumption, Ω
(
, the 
marginal income tax rates can be written as (for i=1,2) 
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(( .     (19)   21
 
Proof: see the Appendix. 
 
Equation (19) has been written using the same format as equation (18), as this makes 
it easy to relate equation (19) to Corollary 2. Equation (19) can be interpreted in the 
same general way as equation (18); however, given that 
1 0 τ >  and  d α α > , as we 
assumed in the interpretation of equation (18), the sufficient condition for a regressive 
tax structure in Corollary 2, i.e., 
12 zz ≥ , must here be replaced with 
12 ρ ρ ≤ (( . Even if 
the high-ability type were to supply more labor than the low-ability type, this 
condition becomes less likely to hold the larger 
2 β  relative to 
1 β . Therefore, with 
“upward comparisons” in the sense that the leisure-weighted consumption by the 
high-ability type has a more than proportional influence on the measure of reference 
consumption, the case of regressive taxation becomes somewhat weaker than before. 
To see this, let us consider the two special cases with 
1 1 β =  and 
2 1 β = , respectively. 
The following result is an immediate consequence of Proposition 3: 
 
Corollary 3. Suppose that 
1 0 τ >  and  d α α > . Then, if 
(i) 
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22 '( ) 0 Tw l = , and if 
(ii)
2 1 β = , the marginal income tax rates become 
 



















Corollary 3 means that if each individual (of both ability types) only compares his/her 
own consumption with that of other low-ability individuals, then the tax structure is 
regressive in the sense that 
11 22 '( ) '( ) Tw l Tw l >  independently of whether the high-
ability type supplies more labor than the low-ability type. On the other hand, if each 
individual solely compares his/her own consumption with that of high-ability   22
individuals – which is arguably more realistic and in line with some earlier research 
mentioned above – then externality correction works in the direction of a more 
progressive income tax structure. Therefore, the marginal income tax rate 
implemented for the low-ability type may either exceed or fall short of the marginal 
income tax rate implemented for the high-ability type. From a policy perspective 
beyond the two-type model, the distributional pattern induced by externality 
correction is probably even more important. This is because simulations have shown 
that in an economy with many ability types, yet without positional concerns, there is 
no general pattern showing that lower-ability types should face higher marginal tax 
rates than higher-ability types; see, e.g., Kanbur and Tuomala (1994).   
 
Note also that the first best special case, in which 
1 0 d τα = = , we have 
11 22 '( ) '( ) Tw l Tw l >  if 
1 0 β = , and 
11 22 '( ) '( ) Tw l Tw l <  if 
2 1 β = . This means that 
upward comparisons give rise to a pattern of externality correction that works in the 





As far as we know, this is the first paper that has highlighted a displaying role of 
leisure in the context of relative consumption comparisons when theoretically 
analyzing optimal public policy. In line with Veblen (1899), we assume that leisure 
has a displaying role in making relative consumption more visible. Our main results 
are summarized as follows. First, increased consumption positionality typically 
implies higher marginal income tax rates for both ability types. Second, the 
consumption-displaying role of leisure provides an argument for regressive income 
taxation in the sense that it contributes to increased marginal income taxation of the 
low-ability type and decreased marginal income taxation of the high-ability type. This 
can be compared to the findings of Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2009), where 
concern for relative leisure implies an argument for progressive taxation. Third, the 
levels of optimal marginal income tax rates – as well as whether the tax system ought 
to be progressive or regressive – are largely dependent on how the measure of 
reference consumption is determined. For example, if agents tend to compare their   23
own consumption more with that of high-ability than low-ability individuals, this will 
influence the optimal tax structure in a progressive direction. 
 
Future research may take several directions. One possible extension follows by 
observing that our analysis assumes full employment. However, as equilibrium 
unemployment is an important phenomenon in real world market economies, the use 
of leisure might not always be the outcome of an optimal choice by the individual. It 
is, therefore, also relevant to combine the study of optimal taxation in economies with 
positional preferences (at least if leisure plays a role in this particular context) with 
imperfect competition in the labor market. There is clearly also room for more 
empirical research regarding relative consumption comparisons in general, and 






Derivation of Equation (11) 
 
Let us start with the marginal income tax rate facing the low-ability type. Combine 
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11 1 1 1
, '( ) zy Tw lw w M R S =−  from equation (4), substituting into equation (A1) and 
rearranging, we get the expression for the marginal income tax rate of the low-ability 
type. The marginal income tax rate of the high-ability type can be derived 
analogously. ■ 
 
Derivation of Equation (12) 
 
Start by differentiating the Lagrangean with respect to Ω:   24
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.     (A2) 
 
 
From equation (1), 
ii uv ΩΔ =− , for i=1,2, and 





x uu α Ω =−  for i=1,2     (A3) 
 
22 2 ˆ ˆx uu α Ω =− .       ( A 4 )  
 
Substituting equations (A3) and (A4) into equation (A2) gives 
 
  ()
12 2 2 2 £ ˆ ˆ
i
x xx uu u αμ λ α λ α
∂
=− − + +
∂Ω
.     (A5) 
 
Now, solving equation (8) for 
1
x u  and equation (9) for 
2 () x u μ λ +  and substituting into 
equation (A5) gives 
 
 
12 1 22 2 2
12
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xx
αλ γ αγ λ α
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Using / ( )/ ( )
iii jj
j x nf z nf z ∂Ω ∂ = ∑  for i=1,2, substituting into equation (A6), 
collecting terms, and rearranging gives equation (12). ■ 
 
Proofs of Propositions 1 and 2 
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Using  , (1 '( ))
ii i i
zx MRS w T wl =− , substituting into equation (A7), and then solving for 
'( )
ii Tw l, we obtain equation (16) in Proposition 2. The special case where  0
i τ =  and 
0 λ = , which also means that  0 d α = , gives equation (14) in Proposition 1. ■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 3 
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We can then use equation (A8) to derive equation (19) in exactly the same way as we 
used equation (A7) to derive equation (16) in the proof of Proposition 2 above. ■  
 
In Corollary 3, it follows that 
1 /1 x ∂Ω∂ =
(
 and 
212 /// 0 xzz ∂Ω∂ = ∂ Ω∂ = ∂ Ω∂ =
( ((
 if 
1 1 β = , while 
2 /1 x ∂Ω ∂ =
(
 and 
112 /// 0 xzz ∂Ω∂ = ∂ Ω∂ = ∂ Ω∂ =
( ((
 if 
2 1 β = . With this 
modification, the marginal income tax rates in the corollary can be derived in the 
same way as we derived equation (19). ■ 
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